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MiCA/CASP Compliance Implementation Guide

Draft
v1.0.0
Feb 1, 2026
GGUIDE-COMPLIANCE-002

MiCA/CASP Compliance Implementation Guide

Version: 1.0.0 Status: Draft Last Updated: 2026-02-01 Specification ID: GGUIDE-COMPLIANCE-002


Table of Contents

  1. Overview
  2. Timeline and Key Deadlines
  3. CASP Authorization Requirements
  4. Travel Rule Implementation (TFR 2023/1113)
  5. Self-Hosted Wallet Verification
  6. AML Integration
  7. Jurisdiction-Specific Timeline Matrix
  8. Implementation Checklist
  9. Common Pitfalls
  10. Regulatory References

1. Overview

1.1 Purpose

This guide maps the Galileo Luxury Standard specification to MiCA (Markets in Crypto-Assets) CASP authorization requirements, enabling adopters to achieve compliance with EU crypto-asset regulations.

1.2 Key Regulations

| Regulation | Citation | Scope | |------------|----------|-------| | MiCA | Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 | Crypto-asset framework | | TFR | Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 | Transfer of Funds (Travel Rule) | | 5AMLD/6AMLD | Directive (EU) 2018/843, 2024/1640 | Anti-money laundering | | DORA | Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 | Digital operational resilience |

1.3 Key Deadline

July 1, 2026: EU-wide CASP authorization mandatory

After this date, operating as a Crypto-Asset Service Provider in the EU without MiCA authorization is prohibited. Penalties can reach up to 12.5% of annual turnover.

1.4 Galileo Relevance

Galileo's token-based product ownership transfers may qualify as crypto-asset services under MiCA. Adopters facilitating token transfers MUST assess whether CASP authorization is required.


2. Timeline and Key Deadlines

2.1 MiCA Implementation Timeline

2023-06-29    MiCA published in Official Journal
     |
2024-06-30    Stablecoin provisions in force
     |
2024-12-30    Full MiCA application (all provisions)
     |
2024-12-30    TFR 2023/1113 in force (Travel Rule)
     |
2025-07-XX    Early adopter jurisdictions (Netherlands)
     |
2025-12-XX    Extended transition (Italy)
     |
2026-07-01    EU-wide CASP authorization mandatory
     |
2026-07-XX    ESMA Technical Standards finalized
     |
2027+         Full enforcement, no transitional provisions

2.2 Transitional Provisions

MiCA Article 143 allows Member States to grant transitional periods of up to 18 months for existing service providers. Key points:

  • Pre-existing registration: CASPs registered under national regimes may continue operating during transition
  • No new registrations: After July 1, 2026, no new national registrations; MiCA-only
  • Early authorization recommended: Apply early regardless of transitional deadline

2.3 DORA Integration

The Digital Operational Resilience Act (DORA) requirements apply from January 17, 2025:

  • ICT risk management framework
  • ICT incident reporting
  • Digital operational resilience testing
  • Third-party risk management

Recommendation: CASPs must comply with both MiCA and DORA simultaneously.


3. CASP Authorization Requirements

3.1 CASP Services Under MiCA

MiCA defines ten categories of crypto-asset services. Galileo adopters should assess applicability:

| Service | MiCA Article | Galileo Relevance | |---------|--------------|-------------------| | Custody and administration | Art. 75 | Yes - Token custody | | Operation of trading platform | Art. 76 | Potentially - Secondary market | | Exchange for fiat | Art. 77 | Potentially - Primary sales | | Exchange for crypto-assets | Art. 78 | Yes - Token transfers | | Execution of orders | Art. 79 | Potentially | | Placing of crypto-assets | Art. 80 | Yes - Token minting | | Reception/transmission of orders | Art. 81 | Potentially | | Advice | Art. 82 | No | | Portfolio management | Art. 83 | No | | Transfer services | Art. 84 | Yes - Ownership transfers |

3.2 Galileo Component Mapping

| MiCA Requirement | MiCA Article | Galileo Component | Implementation | |------------------|--------------|-------------------|----------------| | Customer identification | Art. 72 | IGalileoIdentityRegistry | ONCHAINID claims from trusted issuers | | Travel Rule data | Art. 75-84, TFR | kyc-hooks.md Section 9 | KYC claims contain originator/beneficiary | | AML screening | Art. 68 | aml-screening.md | Chainalysis Oracle + off-chain API | | Transaction records | Art. 68 | audit-trail.md | 7-year retention with timestamps | | Capital requirements | Art. 67 | N/A (business requirement) | EUR 50k-150k depending on service | | Governance | Art. 68 | N/A (organizational) | EU presence + EU-resident director |

3.3 Capital Requirements

| Service Type | Minimum Capital | Notes | |--------------|-----------------|-------| | Custody | EUR 150,000 | Highest requirement | | Exchange for fiat/crypto | EUR 150,000 | | | Trading platform | EUR 150,000 | | | Order execution | EUR 50,000 | | | Placing | EUR 50,000 | | | Advice | EUR 50,000 | | | Transfer services | EUR 50,000 | | | Other services | EUR 50,000 | Base requirement |

Note: Capital must be maintained permanently. Insurance may substitute up to 50%.

3.4 Governance Requirements

| Requirement | Specification | |-------------|---------------| | EU presence | Registered office in an EU Member State | | EU director | At least one director resident in EU | | Good repute | Management body members must have good repute | | Knowledge/expertise | Adequate knowledge, skills, experience | | Time commitment | Sufficient time for responsibilities | | Policies | Written policies for all MiCA-required areas | | Segregation | Segregation of client assets |


4. Travel Rule Implementation (TFR 2023/1113)

4.1 Overview

The Transfer of Funds Regulation (TFR) 2023/1113 implements FATF Recommendation 16 (Travel Rule) in the EU with stricter requirements than FATF.

Critical: There is NO de minimis threshold for CASP-to-CASP transfers in the EU.

| Transfer Type | Threshold | TFR Requirement | |---------------|-----------|-----------------| | CASP to CASP | None | Full originator + beneficiary data required | | CASP to Unhosted Wallet | EUR 1,000 | Full originator data + wallet verification | | Unhosted to CASP | EUR 1,000 | Full beneficiary data + wallet verification |

4.2 Required Data Fields

Originator Data (TFR Article 4)

| Field | Required | Source in Galileo | |-------|----------|-------------------| | Full name | Yes | KYC claim: credentialSubject.name | | Account number (wallet address) | Yes | Sender wallet address | | Address OR National ID OR Customer ID OR Date+Place of birth | One required | KYC claim: multiple fields |

Beneficiary Data (TFR Article 4)

| Field | Required | Source in Galileo | |-------|----------|-------------------| | Full name | Yes | KYC claim: credentialSubject.name | | Account number (wallet address) | Yes | Receiver wallet address |

4.3 KYC Hook Integration

The Travel Rule data is retrieved from ONCHAINID claims via IGalileoIdentityRegistry:

Reference: specifications/compliance/kyc-hooks.md Section 9

/**
 * @notice Get Travel Rule data from identity claims
 * @param _address The party address
 * @return originatorData Encoded originator/beneficiary data
 */
function getTravelRuleData(address _address)
    external view returns (bytes memory originatorData)
{
    IIdentity identity = identityRegistry.identity(_address);

    // Retrieve KYC claim data
    uint256 kycTopic = GalileoClaimTopics.KYC_BASIC;
    bytes memory claimData = identity.getClaimData(kycTopic);

    // Claim data contains hash and URI for off-chain retrieval
    // (vcHash, vcURI) = abi.decode(claimData, (bytes32, string))
    return claimData;
}

4.4 Code Example: Travel Rule Data Retrieval

// travel-rule-data.ts
// Reference: kyc-hooks.md Section 9

interface TravelRuleData {
  originator: {
    name: string;
    accountNumber: string; // Wallet address
    address?: string;
    nationalId?: string;
    dateOfBirth?: string;
    placeOfBirth?: string;
    customerId?: string;
  };
  beneficiary: {
    name: string;
    accountNumber: string;
  };
}

async function getTravelRuleDataFromClaims(
  senderAddress: string,
  receiverAddress: string
): Promise<TravelRuleData> {
  // Retrieve identity from registry
  const senderIdentity = await identityRegistry.identity(senderAddress);
  const receiverIdentity = await identityRegistry.identity(receiverAddress);

  // Get KYC claim data (stored off-chain, referenced by hash)
  const senderClaimHash = await senderIdentity.getClaimData(KYC_BASIC_TOPIC);
  const receiverClaimHash = await receiverIdentity.getClaimData(KYC_BASIC_TOPIC);

  // Retrieve full claim content from off-chain storage
  const senderClaim = await fetchClaimContent(senderClaimHash);
  const receiverClaim = await fetchClaimContent(receiverClaimHash);

  return {
    originator: {
      name: senderClaim.credentialSubject.name,
      accountNumber: senderAddress,
      address: senderClaim.credentialSubject.address,
      nationalId: senderClaim.credentialSubject.nationalId,
      dateOfBirth: senderClaim.credentialSubject.dateOfBirth,
      placeOfBirth: senderClaim.credentialSubject.placeOfBirth,
      customerId: senderClaim.credentialSubject.customerId
    },
    beneficiary: {
      name: receiverClaim.credentialSubject.name,
      accountNumber: receiverAddress
    }
  };
}

// Assemble Travel Rule message for counterparty
async function prepareTravelRuleMessage(
  from: string,
  to: string,
  amount: bigint,
  tokenId: string
): Promise<TravelRuleMessage> {
  const data = await getTravelRuleDataFromClaims(from, to);

  return {
    transactionId: generateTransactionId(),
    transferDate: new Date().toISOString(),
    transferAmount: amount.toString(),
    assetType: 'PRODUCT_TOKEN',
    assetIdentifier: tokenId,
    originator: data.originator,
    beneficiary: data.beneficiary,
    originatingVASP: GALILEO_VASP_ID,
    beneficiaryVASP: await resolveBeneficiaryVASP(to)
  };
}

4.5 Travel Rule Verification Flow

PRE-TRANSFER
|
+-> 1. Retrieve sender identity from registry
|       identity(senderAddress) -> IIdentity
|
+-> 2. Retrieve receiver identity from registry
|       identity(receiverAddress) -> IIdentity
|
+-> 3. Verify both have KYC claims with Travel Rule data
|       batchVerify(address, [KYC_BASIC]) -> true
|
+-> 4. If value >EUR 10,000: verify KYC_ENHANCED claims
|
+-> 5. Assemble TravelRuleData structure
|
+-> 6. Exchange data with counterparty CASP (TRISA/OpenVASP)
|
+-> 7. Execute transfer

POST-TRANSFER
|
+-> 8. Emit TravelRuleTransfer event with claim references
|
+-> 9. Store Travel Rule message in audit trail
|
+-> 10. Retain for 5 years per TFR requirements

4.6 High-Value Transfer Handling

For transfers exceeding EUR 10,000, additional requirements apply:

| Requirement | Implementation | |-------------|----------------| | Enhanced KYC | Verify KYC_ENHANCED claim topic | | Source of funds | Verify credentialSubject.sourceOfFunds | | Manual review flag | Flag transaction for compliance review | | Travel Rule exchange | Ensure message exchange before execution |

event HighValueTransfer(
    address indexed from,
    address indexed to,
    uint256 amount,
    bytes32 senderClaimHash,
    bytes32 receiverClaimHash,
    uint256 timestamp
);

5. Self-Hosted Wallet Verification

5.1 TFR Article 14 Requirements

For transfers >EUR 1,000 involving self-hosted (unhosted) wallets:

| Direction | CASP Obligation | |-----------|-----------------| | CASP -> Self-hosted | Verify customer controls the wallet | | Self-hosted -> CASP | Verify originator controls the wallet |

5.2 Verification Methods

| Method | Description | Galileo Support | |--------|-------------|-----------------| | Signature verification | Customer signs message with wallet | IGalileoIdentityRegistry.verifyIdentity() | | Micro-transaction | Small test transfer | Standard ERC-20 transfer | | Hardware wallet proof | Device attestation | Custom implementation |

5.3 Implementation Pattern

async function verifyWalletOwnership(
  walletAddress: string,
  customerIdentityId: string
): Promise<OwnershipProof> {
  // Generate challenge
  const challenge = generateChallenge();

  // Request signature from customer
  const signature = await requestCustomerSignature(walletAddress, challenge);

  // Verify signature matches wallet address
  const recoveredAddress = ethers.verifyMessage(challenge, signature);

  if (recoveredAddress.toLowerCase() !== walletAddress.toLowerCase()) {
    throw new Error('Wallet ownership verification failed');
  }

  // Link wallet to customer identity
  await identityRegistry.linkWalletToIdentity(
    customerIdentityId,
    walletAddress,
    signature
  );

  return {
    walletAddress,
    verifiedAt: new Date(),
    method: 'SIGNATURE',
    challengeHash: keccak256(challenge)
  };
}

6. AML Integration

6.1 MiCA AML Requirements

MiCA Article 68 requires CASPs to comply with AML/CFT obligations under 5AMLD/6AMLD:

| Requirement | MiCA Reference | Galileo Implementation | |-------------|----------------|------------------------| | Customer due diligence | Art. 68(1) | KYC claims via ONCHAINID | | Transaction monitoring | Art. 68(2) | On-chain events + off-chain analytics | | Sanctions screening | Art. 68(3) | Chainalysis Oracle + TRM Labs | | Suspicious activity reporting | Art. 68(4) | SAR workflow (off-chain) | | Record keeping | Art. 68(5) | 5-year retention per data-retention.md |

6.2 Sanctions Screening Integration

Reference: specifications/compliance/aml-screening.md

Transfer Request
      |
      v
+---------------------+
| Layer 1: On-Chain   |
| Chainalysis Oracle  |
| (Real-time)         |
+---------------------+
      |
      +-> Sanctioned? YES -> BLOCK
      |
      +-> NO
           |
           v
+---------------------+
| Layer 2: Off-Chain  |
| TRM Labs / Elliptic |
| (If >EUR 10,000)    |
+---------------------+
      |
      +-> Risk Score > 70 -> BLOCK
      |
      +-> Risk Score 31-70 -> FLAG + ALLOW
      |
      +-> Risk Score 0-30 -> ALLOW
           |
           v
     Transfer Executed

6.3 Risk Scoring Thresholds

| Score Range | Risk Level | Action | Review Cadence | |-------------|------------|--------|----------------| | 0-30 | Low | Automatic approval | Annual | | 31-50 | Medium-Low | Enhanced monitoring | Quarterly | | 51-70 | Medium-High | Manual review required | Monthly | | 71-85 | High | Senior review required | Before each tx | | 86-100 | Critical | Block + escalate | Immediate |


7. Jurisdiction-Specific Timeline Matrix

7.1 EU Member State Deadlines

| Jurisdiction | Transitional Deadline | NCA | Status | Notes | |--------------|----------------------|-----|--------|-------| | Netherlands | July 2025 | AFM/DNB | Early adopter | Strictest interpretation | | Germany | July 2026 | BaFin | Standard | MiCA-aligned | | France | July 2026 | AMF | Standard | PSAN regime extended | | Italy | December 2025 | CONSOB/Banca d'Italia | Extended transition | Local registration until Dec 2025 | | Spain | July 2026 | CNMV | Standard | | | Ireland | July 2026 | CBI | Standard | | | Luxembourg | July 2026 | CSSF | Standard | | | Portugal | July 2026 | CMVM/Banco de Portugal | Standard | | | Belgium | July 2026 | FSMA | Standard | | | Austria | July 2026 | FMA | Standard | | | Malta | July 2026 | MFSA | Standard | VFA framework sunset | | Estonia | July 2026 | FSA | Standard | Crypto-friendly | | Lithuania | July 2026 | Bank of Lithuania | Standard | Crypto-friendly |

7.2 Recommendation

Apply for MiCA authorization early, regardless of local transitional deadline.

Reasons:

  1. NCA processing times may be long (6-12 months)
  2. First-mover advantage in EU-wide passport
  3. Regulatory uncertainty during transition
  4. Client confidence in fully authorized status

7.3 NCA Contact Points

| Jurisdiction | NCA | MiCA Portal | |--------------|-----|-------------| | Netherlands | AFM | https://www.afm.nl/en/sector/registers/mica | | Germany | BaFin | https://www.bafin.de/EN/Aufsicht/CryptoAssets | | France | AMF | https://www.amf-france.org/en/professionals/crypto-assets | | Italy | CONSOB | https://www.consob.it/web/consob-and-its-activities/mica |


8. Implementation Checklist

8.1 Identity and KYC

| # | Requirement | Regulation | Verification | Galileo Reference | |---|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------------| | 1 | Identity Registry deployed | MiCA Art. 72 | Deployment verification | IGalileoIdentityRegistry | | 2 | Trusted KYC issuers configured | MiCA Art. 72 | Registry configuration | IClaimTopicsRegistry | | 3 | KYC claims include Travel Rule fields | TFR Art. 4 | Claim schema validation | kyc-hooks.md S5.3 | | 4 | KYC_BASIC claim topic active | MiCA Art. 72 | Topic registration | GalileoClaimTopics | | 5 | KYC_ENHANCED claim topic active | MiCA Art. 72 | Topic registration | GalileoClaimTopics |

Checklist:

  • [ ] 1. IGalileoIdentityRegistry deployed and configured
  • [ ] 2. Claim Topics Registry populated with KYC/KYB topics
  • [ ] 3. Trusted Issuers Registry configured with KYC providers
  • [ ] 4. KYC claims contain Travel Rule required fields
  • [ ] 5. Enhanced KYC for high-value threshold configured

8.2 Travel Rule

| # | Requirement | Regulation | Verification | Galileo Reference | |---|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------------| | 6 | No threshold for CASP-to-CASP | TFR Art. 4 | Transfer hook logic | compliance-module.md | | 7 | EUR 1,000 threshold for self-hosted | TFR Art. 14 | Threshold configuration | kyc-hooks.md S4 | | 8 | Travel Rule data exchange implemented | TFR Art. 5 | Integration test | TRISA/OpenVASP | | 9 | Originator data retrievable | TFR Art. 4 | API test | kyc-hooks.md S9.3 | | 10 | Beneficiary data retrievable | TFR Art. 4 | API test | kyc-hooks.md S9.3 |

Checklist:

  • [ ] 6. All CASP transfers require Travel Rule data (no threshold)
  • [ ] 7. Self-hosted wallet verification for >EUR 1,000
  • [ ] 8. TRISA or OpenVASP integration operational
  • [ ] 9. getTravelRuleData() function returns complete originator data
  • [ ] 10. Beneficiary data included in all outgoing transfers

8.3 AML Screening

| # | Requirement | Regulation | Verification | Galileo Reference | |---|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------------| | 11 | On-chain sanctions oracle | MiCA Art. 68 | Oracle address configured | aml-screening.md S3 | | 12 | Off-chain API integration | MiCA Art. 68 | API test | aml-screening.md S11 | | 13 | Strict mode enabled | Best practice | Configuration check | aml-screening.md S10.2 | | 14 | High-value threshold screening | MiCA Art. 68 | Threshold test | aml-screening.md S6 | | 15 | Risk scoring implemented | MiCA Art. 68 | Score calculation test | aml-screening.md S7 |

Checklist:

  • [ ] 11. Chainalysis Oracle address verified for deployment chain
  • [ ] 12. TRM Labs or Elliptic API integrated and tested
  • [ ] 13. Strict mode (fail-closed) enabled for sanctions checks
  • [ ] 14. Off-chain screening for transfers >EUR 10,000
  • [ ] 15. Risk scoring thresholds calibrated

8.4 Record Keeping

| # | Requirement | Regulation | Verification | Galileo Reference | |---|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------------| | 16 | Transaction records 5+ years | TFR Art. 7 | Retention policy | data-retention.md S3.1 | | 17 | KYC records 5+ years | 5AMLD Art. 40 | Retention policy | data-retention.md S3.2.1 | | 18 | Travel Rule messages retained | TFR Art. 7 | Audit trail check | audit-trail.md | | 19 | Sanctions check logs | MiCA Art. 68 | Audit events | aml-screening.md S8 | | 20 | Audit trail tamper-evident | MiCA Art. 68 | Merkle anchoring | audit-trail.md |

Checklist:

  • [ ] 16. Transaction records retained for minimum 5 years
  • [ ] 17. KYC/AML records retained for 5 years from end of relationship
  • [ ] 18. Travel Rule messages stored with transaction reference
  • [ ] 19. All sanctions checks logged with timestamp and result
  • [ ] 20. Daily Merkle root anchoring for audit integrity

8.5 Organizational

| # | Requirement | Regulation | Verification | Galileo Reference | |---|-------------|------------|--------------|-------------------| | 21 | CASP authorization application | MiCA Art. 63 | NCA submission | - | | 22 | Capital requirements met | MiCA Art. 67 | Bank statement | - | | 23 | EU director appointed | MiCA Art. 68 | Corporate records | - | | 24 | DORA compliance | DORA | ICT assessment | - | | 25 | Jurisdiction rules configured | MiCA | Module configuration | jurisdiction-rules.md |

Checklist:

  • [ ] 21. MiCA authorization application submitted to NCA
  • [ ] 22. Minimum capital (EUR 50k-150k) maintained
  • [ ] 23. EU-resident director in management body
  • [ ] 24. DORA ICT risk management framework implemented
  • [ ] 25. Jurisdiction compliance modules configured per jurisdiction-rules.md

9. Common Pitfalls

9.1 Pitfall 1: Missing Travel Rule Threshold Nuances

What goes wrong: Applying EUR 1,000 threshold incorrectly for EU CASP-to-CASP transfers

Why it happens: Confusion with FATF Recommendation 16 threshold vs TFR 2023/1113

How to avoid:

  • TFR 2023/1113 has NO de minimis threshold for CASP-to-CASP transfers
  • EUR 1,000 threshold applies ONLY to self-hosted wallet verification
  • Document clearly: "All crypto transfers between CASPs require full Travel Rule data"

Warning signs: Documentation suggesting small CASP-to-CASP transfers are exempt

9.2 Pitfall 2: Misunderstanding MiCA Authorization Deadline Variations

What goes wrong: Assuming July 2026 deadline is uniform across EU

Why it happens: MiCA allows Member State transitional arrangements

How to avoid:

  • Document jurisdiction-specific deadlines (see Section 7)
  • Netherlands: July 2025 (early adopter)
  • Italy: December 2025 (extended transition)
  • Standard: July 2026
  • Recommend early authorization regardless of local deadline

Warning signs: Single deadline cited without jurisdiction context

9.3 Pitfall 3: Incomplete Originator/Beneficiary Data

What goes wrong: KYC claims missing Travel Rule required fields

Why it happens: KYC designed for identity verification, not Travel Rule

How to avoid:

  • Ensure KYC claim schema includes ALL TFR Article 4 fields
  • Validate claims against Travel Rule requirements before acceptance
  • Reference kyc-hooks.md Section 5.3 for required claim data

Warning signs: KYC claims with only name and no address/ID/DOB

9.4 Pitfall 4: Sanctions Screening Gaps

What goes wrong: Relying solely on on-chain oracle with 60+ day latency

Why it happens: Not understanding oracle update delays

How to avoid:

  • Layer on-chain oracle with off-chain API (TRM Labs, Elliptic)
  • Implement daily batch scanning of all token holders
  • Maintain supplementary blocklist for new OFAC designations

Warning signs: Only Chainalysis Oracle configured; no off-chain API

9.5 Pitfall 5: Ignoring Self-Hosted Wallet Requirements

What goes wrong: Not verifying customer controls self-hosted wallet

Why it happens: Focus on CASP-to-CASP, forgetting self-custody

How to avoid:

  • Implement wallet ownership verification for >EUR 1,000 to/from self-hosted
  • Signature verification is simplest method
  • Link verified wallets to customer identity

Warning signs: No self-hosted wallet verification flow implemented


10. Regulatory References

10.1 Primary Regulations

| Regulation | Citation | Key Articles | |------------|----------|--------------| | MiCA | Regulation (EU) 2023/1114 | Art. 63-84 (CASP), Art. 143 (Transition) | | TFR | Regulation (EU) 2023/1113 | Art. 4 (Data), Art. 14 (Self-hosted) | | 5AMLD | Directive (EU) 2018/843 | Art. 40 (Retention) | | DORA | Regulation (EU) 2022/2554 | Full (ICT resilience) |

10.2 Galileo Specifications

| Specification | Path | Relevant Sections | |---------------|------|-------------------| | KYC Hooks | specifications/compliance/kyc-hooks.md | S5 (KYC Levels), S9 (Travel Rule) | | AML Screening | specifications/compliance/aml-screening.md | S3 (Oracle), S6 (High-Value), S11 (Providers) | | Data Retention | specifications/infrastructure/data-retention.md | S3 (Classification), S4 (Conflict Resolution) | | Jurisdiction Rules | specifications/contracts/compliance/jurisdiction-rules.md | Full |

10.3 External Resources


Document Metadata

| Property | Value | |----------|-------| | Guide ID | GGUIDE-COMPLIANCE-002 | | Version | 1.0.0 | | Status | Draft | | Created | 2026-02-01 | | Last Modified | 2026-02-01 | | Authors | Galileo Luxury Standard TSC | | Target Audience | Implementers, Compliance Officers, Legal Teams | | Compliance | MiCA 2023/1114, TFR 2023/1113, 5AMLD |


End of MiCA/CASP Compliance Implementation Guide